Artificial neural networks have become fixtures in neuroscience research, but they are not one tool doing one job. According to a review of deep learning in social neuroscience, they serve three distinct purposes: improving statistical models that predict behavior from brain activity, annotating complex stimuli and behavior in naturalistic data, and serving as cognitive models that are themselves compared against the brain. Each use carries different assumptions and different risks.
The central question cutting across all three is whether a network's performance says anything about how the brain actually works. Recent work on grid cells suggests that without explicit biological constraints, impressive-seeming results can amount to what one MIT team calls postdiction rather than prediction. Here we lay out the three use cases, the interpretability problem, and the grid-cell cautionary tale.
Decision Framework: Applying ANNs in Neuroscience Research
To decide which role an ANN should play in your project, it helps to separate the three use cases by their goals and by what can go wrong in each. The table below organizes the applications identified in the deep social neuroscience literature alongside the standing concerns researchers raise about interpretability and realism.
| ANN Application Type | Primary Research Goal | Key Scientific Consideration |
|---|---|---|
| Improving statistical models | Predict behavior from brain activity | Optimizes predictive power rather than biological mechanism; predictive and explanatory goals are assessed differently |
| Annotating social stimuli and behavior | Quantify complex, naturalistic data for analysis | Annotation quality depends on the network's training data; the network itself is not a brain model |
| Creating cognitive models of brain function | Understand neural mechanisms and generate new hypotheses about brain processing | Interpretability and validity of mapping networks to brains remain actively debated |
The distinctions matter because the failure modes differ. A statistical model that predicts behavior accurately is judged on prediction; a cognitive model is judged on whether its internal structure tells you something about the brain. As a review in network neuroscience notes, explanatory models are assessed by goodness-of-fit with penalties for complexity, a procedure that can favor overly complex models that overfit the data—so the appropriate statistical standard depends on which use case you are in.
The Critical Debate: Ensuring Neurobiological Realism
For the third use case—networks as cognitive models—the field's most consequential open question is how much biology a model must contain before its behavior counts as evidence about the brain. In a Nature Reviews Neuroscience perspective, Pulvermüller and colleagues argue that neural network models have real potential for improving our understanding of brain function, but that various aspects of these models may need to be constrained to make them neurobiologically realistic and therefore better tools for understanding how the brain works.
The extent and necessity of those constraints remain a central point of discussion. No one in the debate disputes that unconstrained networks can be useful for prediction or annotation. The disagreement is about the third use case: whether a network that matches brain data in some respect—representational similarity, error patterns, response profiles—can be treated as a model of the mechanism that produced those data, or whether it is simply a flexible function that happens to fit.
Reviews of vision and language research capture both sides of this tension. Comparisons between deep neural networks and brains in those domains have validated existing hypotheses and generated new ones, challenging prior views of information processing, connectivity, and computational goals. Yet the same literature acknowledges that debates persist over the interpretability and validity of mapping networks to brains, which the authors read as underscoring the need for more refined models and methods. The pattern is consistent: networks earn their keep as hypothesis generators, but their status as mechanistic models stays contested.
Case Study: The Grid Cell Example and Interpretability Pitfalls
The grid-cell literature supplies the sharpest available illustration of what happens when that caution is ignored. Earlier work reported that neural networks trained on navigation tasks spontaneously developed grid-cell-like activity, a result widely read as showing that the brain's grid-cell code emerges naturally from the computational demands of the task.
An MIT team led in part by Rylan Schaeffer, then a senior research associate at MIT, re-examined that claim. Their finding: "in order to obtain a result with grid cells, the researchers training the models needed to bake in those results with specific, biologically implausible implementation choices," in Schaeffer's words. The spontaneous emergence was not spontaneous. It was produced by design decisions about the training setup that were themselves not biologically motivated.
Without those constraints, the MIT group found that very few neural networks generated grid-cell-like activity at all. Their interpretation is direct: such models do not necessarily generate useful predictions of how the brain works. The result that looked like a prediction about the brain was, on closer inspection, a consequence of choices the experimenters made before training began—postdiction dressed as prediction.
The lesson generalizes beyond grid cells. Before treating any network's internal structure as evidence about neural mechanism, a researcher should ask what architectural choices, training objectives, and constraints shaped that structure, and whether those choices were biologically motivated or merely convenient. If the biologically interesting result only appears under biologically implausible settings, the result belongs to the settings, not to the brain.
Actionable Insights for Neuroscientists
When employing artificial neural networks in neuroscience research, prioritize models that incorporate known biological constraints, especially when the goal is to generate testable hypotheses about brain function, and critically evaluate model interpretability. Concretely: match your use case to your evaluation standard—prediction for statistical and annotation applications, mechanistic validity for cognitive modeling—and document the constraints you imposed on any network you intend to interpret as a brain model.
These are conceptual guidelines rather than implementation tutorials, and they deliberately do not adjudicate among specific architectures; the evidence here concerns how networks are used, not which architecture to pick. The measurable indicator of progress is concrete: increased publication of ANN-based neuroscience studies that explicitly detail their biological constraints, discuss interpretability, and validate hypotheses through independent biological experiments. Until that becomes the norm, treat any network-brain comparison that skips those steps the way the MIT team treated the grid-cell claim—as a result about the model, not about the brain.





